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GIUSEPPE CANTILLO  
THE CONCEPT OF SPACE IN HEGEL:  
THE EARLY JENA YEARS 
ABSTRACT: The last two decades of the Twentieth Century marked an ever-growing 
interest in philosophy of nature within the Hegel-Forschung. The essay outlines a renewed 
appraisal of the systematic form, which affords a better reckoning of the anti-
mechanistic quality of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. This concerns, primarily, the 
progressive movement from externality to internality, then from the objectivity of 
nature to the subjectivity of the spirit, and hence the transition from mechanism to life 
as the most direct expression of the idea. It is from within the framework of such a 
general speculative perspective that we must consider the concept of space, and engage 
with Hegel’s 1801 work, Dissertatio de orbitis planetarum. The focus will then shift to how 
Hegel’s system was first traced out in Jena between 1803-1805, before the break with 
Schelling, and the “phenomenological crisis of the system”. The climax of this 
recognition may be identified in Hegel’s exposition of 1804-1805 in which he validates 
the theory of ideality – or abstractness – of space and time as separate forms, i.e. 
considered per se. The reality of space-time becomes the being of time in space and the 
being of space in time, and the “real union” of the two is “the real infinity of the ether”, 
of absolute matter, which he terms motion. 
SOMMARIO: Gli ultimi due decenni del Ventesimo secolo hanno visto emergere un 
crescente interesse verso la filosofia della natura nell’ambito della Hegel-Forschung. Il 
contributo delinea un nuovo modo d’intendere la forma sistematica, che consente una 
migliore valutazione della qualità anti-meccanicista della filosofia della natura di Hegel. 
Ciò implica, innanzitutto, il progressivo movimento dall’esteriorità all’interiorità, in 
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seguito dall’oggettività della natura alla soggettività dello spirito, e dunque la transizione 
dal meccanicismo alla vita come più diretta espressione dell’idea. È nel quadro di tale 
generica prospettiva speculativa che occorre prendere in considerazione il concetto di 
spazio, e relazionarsi con l’opera di Hegel del 1801, la Dissertatio de orbitis planetarum. 
L’interesse si sposterà poi sulle modalità con cui il sistema di Hegel venne tracciato per 
la prima volta a Jena, tra 1803-1805, prima della rottura con Schelling e della “crisi 
fenomenologica del sistema”. Il climax di tale riconoscimento è forse da identificare 
nell’esposizione di Hegel del 1804-1805, nella quale egli corrobora la teoria dell’idealità 
– o astrazione – dello spazio e del tempo come forme separate, ovvero considerate per 
se. La realtà dello spazio-tempo si profila come il divenire del tempo nello spazio e il 
divenire dello spazio nel tempo, e la “reale unione” dei due è “la reale infinità dell’etere”, 
della materia assoluta, che egli definisce movimento. 
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1. Starting from the closing decades of the 20th century, the field of Hegel-
Forschung has witnessed the emergence of a new approach to the 
philosophy of nature, in the context of a renewed appreciation of the 
value of the systematic form. The Hegelian system is no longer perceived 
– to borrow an image Croce was fond of – as a series of gates enclosing 
dialectic as the logic of life and history, but rather as the form expressing 
the very movement of the “absolute idea”: as the various 
“Seinsbereichen” in which the same underlying structure – the logical 
element destined to present itself through a panoply of “figures” – 
unfolds in different, multifarious ways. Thus Naturphilosophie too testifies 
to the power philosophical reflection has to explore the ontic and 
discover the immanent logic within it, “the ‘pure network’ of universal 
thought determinations within which we are bound to include all 
experience and knowledge of nature”.1 The systematic and encyclopaedic 
form corresponds to the very idea of philosophy; it is not only of 
epistemological significance, but also of ontological import, since science 
– which is organically exposed in the system – is the science of “essence” 
(Wesen).  
                                                        
1 Verra 2002, 12. 
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From § 10 of the Philosophical Encyclopaedia, which Hegel composed 
in Nürnberg (from 1808), in the context of his work as a Gymnasium 
teacher, it clearly emerges that “the three main parts” in which “science 
as a whole” may be divided – “logic”, the “science of nature” and the 
“science of the spirit” – reflect three modes of being of the “essence”, 
namely: “the logical element” (or “pure concept” and “abstract idea”), 
which is the “eternally simple essence [considered] in itself”; “nature”, 
which is “this essence externalised” (or “the reality of the idea” in the 
form of “exterior being-there”); and “the spirit”, which is the “return of 
the essence within itself from its externalisation” (or “the reality of the 
idea” in the form of “self-consciousness”).2 Yet already in the letter 
Hegel addressed to Schelling on 2 November 1800, when he was about 
to “venture” into “the literary uproar in Jena”, he stated the need to give 
a well planned and systematic form to the “ideal of his youthful days”.3 
In doing so, the philosopher was assimilating scientificity to 
systematicity, in line with a trend in the culture of his age, which looked 
to the ancient astronomical model of the order of the universe, as well as 
to the more recent biological model of living organisms. Already Kant 
had regarded systematicity as a defining feature of scientificity, which is 
to say rational enquiry:  
The systematic unity – we read in the Critique of Pure Reason – is what first of all 
forms the common cognition into science, that is, from a mere aggregate of it 
forms a system […]. I understand by a system the unity of diverse cognitions 
under an idea. This is the reason-conception of the form of a whole […]. The 
whole is therefore membered (articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio); it 
may increase, certainly, internally (per intus susceptionem), but not externally (per 
appositionem), as an animal body, whose growth adds no member, but without 
change of proportion, renders each of its member stronger and more fit for its 
end.4 
Hegel already explicitly noted this need for systematicity and 
cohesiveness at the beginning of his Jena period, in his Differenzschrift. 
                                                        
2 Hegel 1970a, 10.  
3 Hegel 1952, 59-60.  
4 Kant 1983, 695-96 (Kant 1838, 624-625).  
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Here he argues that because the relation of the limited to the absolute is 
manifold “philosophizing must aim to posit this manifold as internally 
connected, and there necessarily arises the need to produce a totality of 
knowledge, a system of science”.5 The system is established neither through an 
analytical method, nor through a synthetical one; rather, it is founded on 
the “development of reason itself”; it is a “self-production of reason”, in 
which “the Absolute shaps itself into an objective totality, which is a 
whole in itself held fast and complete, […] an organisation of 
propositions and intuitions”.6  
Reflection remains the “tool” of philosophy, as the faculty of 
limitation and determination from which the wealth and multiplicity of 
knowledge and reality spring; yet, as speculation, reflection transcends 
itself, enters “in relation with the Absolute” and turns into “reason”, 
destroying itself, its own work, its own rigid determinations and 
limitations. In such a way, thought becomes the thought of life: from the 
“night of mere reflection” there emerges “the noon of life”.7 According 
to this perspective, in his Differenzschrift Hegel draws a comparison 
between Fichte’s system and that of Schelling.  
The principle behind Fichte’s system is certainly “the authentic 
principle of speculation” – “pure thinking of itself, pure 
selfconsciousness, Ego=Ego. I am”. Yet this principle is not expressed 
or fully revealed in the system, where “the Subject-Object reveals itself a 
subjective Subject-Object” that is always confronted with the non-
mediated, non-unified “objective Subject-Object”8: “the essence of the 
Ego and its positing do not coincide: the Ego does not become objective to 
itself (sich)”.9 Unification, therefore, is only conceived in practical terms, 
as the object of a need, of a “practical postulate”, an infinite “having to 
                                                        
5 Hegel 1970b, 46.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 35. 
8 Ibid., 11-12.  
9 Ibid., 56. 
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be”. This reveals the limits of Fichte’s thought, where “the result of the 
system does not lead back to its starting point”.10  
By contrast, “the principle of identity is the absolute principle of the 
whole system of Schelling. Philosophy and system coincide: identity is not 
lost in the parts, and much less in the result”.11 The “philosophy of 
nature” and “transcendental philosophy” are the two “sciences of the 
Absolute”. In them, “in the necessary forms of its existence one and the 
same Absolute is set forth”, the Subject-Object as both objective 
Subject-Object (nature) and subjective Subject-Object (intelligence or the 
spirit).12 The “point of indifference” towards which the philosophy of 
nature and the philosophy of the spirit tend in their construction of the 
Absolute as both objective and subjective totality, as nature and spirit, is 
the intuition of the Absolute as that “original identity”13 which – through 
its eternal self-manifestation – becomes other than itself and is known in 
its being-other. 
2. Through these preliminary considerations on “contemporary 
philosophising” and his comparison between the systems of Fichte and 
Schelling, Hegel developed his first outline of a system. This included an 
introduction to the system based on the movement leading from the 
point of view of the intellect and of reflection to that of speculation. 
Driven by the “need of philosophy”, which tends to overcome division, 
the logic of the intellect overcomes its own rigid determinations and 
fixed oppositions by relating the limited and finite to the Absolute. This 
paves the way for the construction of a “system of science”, which alone 
is capable of ensuring the knowledge and exposition of the Absolute. 
For the being of the Absolute is to be found in its manifestation, which 
is to say in its multiple expressions and the forms of knowledge 
pertaining to them: “the Absolute must posit itself […] within 
                                                        
10 Ibid., 68.  
11 Ibid., 94.  
12 Ibid., 101.  
13 Ibid., 112. See Marcuse 1975, 55-57. On the connection between the concept of 
“original identity” and that of “life”, see 46-48. 
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manifestation, i.e. not destroy it, but establish it as an identity”. 14 After a 
first introductory part (logic), the system is divided into a “theoretical 
part”, or “philosophy of nature”, and a “practical part”, or “philosophy 
of intelligence” or of the “spirit”. It then ends by reverting to its 
beginning, with the “polarity” of the intuition of the Absolute, which “is 
found objectively (art and religion)” or “takes shape” (speculation). Both 
sciences, that of nature and that of the spirit, expose the Absolute: the 
former as objective Subject-Object, the latter as subjective Subject-
Object. For each of these two forms of manifestation of the Absolute, 
they trace the development “from the lower powers to […] the totality”. 
Drawing upon a Spinozan principle, Hegel therefore establishes a 
correspondence between the two sciences, as between spirit and nature: 
“the order and connection of ideas (i.e. of the subjective)  is the 
same as the order and connection of things (i.e. of the objective)”.15  
As concerns Naturphilosophie in particular, what we have here is a 
dialectic knowledge of nature that grasps its profound dynamism 
through a thought that rejects the rigidity and fixity of intellectual 
concepts, along with all quantitative approaches to natural phenomena, 
and instead grasps its fluidity: nature thus shows itself through its hidden 
rationality by manifesting itself as life. This entails a transcending of the 
empirical and experimental method of the science of nature16 and the 
setting of the latter against the backdrop of a philosophy founded on the 
“intellectual intuition”17 of the close identity and unity between mens (the 
spirit) and nature, reason and reality, where the distinction between the 
                                                        
14 Hegel 1970b., 48. 
15 Ibid., 106. 
16 The distancing of Hegel’s philosophy of nature from the method of modern 
science – as it had taken shape starting from Galileo Galilei – is founded upon the very 
conception of philosophy as speculation and hence – as Nicolao Merker has aptly 
noted in Le origini della logica hegeliana (Hegel a Jena) – upon the “idealistic way of 
conceiving the objectivity or reality of nature as an (objectified) alienation of the Idea 
and hence the (empirical) unity of the material as a direct emanation of the (speculative) 
unity of the Idea” (Merker 1961, 132-133). 
17 Schelling 2006, 106. 
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two stems from the original duplication of the original whole, which is to 
say the Absolute.18  
Hegel explicitly refers to intuition, without which it is impossible to 
overcome division and the endless loop in which reflection – the 
knowledge of the intellect – gets caught, in one of the fragments of the 
Nachlass for the lecture series he held in 1801-02 on the Introductio in 
Philosophiam [“Die Idee des absoluten Wesen” (1a-2b)]. Here, in a polemical 
engagement with critical philosophy, he identifies “a firm and clear 
intuition” of the idea of the Absolute, to be set forth in the system of 
philosophy, as “the primary condition for philosophising” and its 
starting point. The articulation of the latter must correspond to the very 
movement of the “absolute essence”, which “defines in the idea, so to 
speak, the image of itself, and is itself realized in nature [and] takes itself 
up as spirit, reverting to itself and acquiring self-knowledge”. 19  
According to the system plan presented in Die Idee des absoluten 
Wesens, logic and metaphysics, which is to say the “science of the idea in 
itself” (i.e. not yet as “universe”) is to be followed by “the science of the 
reality of the idea”, which in turn will differentiate itself into the 
philosophy of nature and that of the spirit. The philosophy of nature will 
lend expression to “the real body of the idea” (the “universe”) as the 
“system of the heavens” and the system of the “earth”. Within the latter, 
the reality of the idea presents itself as “life” in an “organic” form, the 
“concept” of which includes the “ideal moments” of both the 
“mechanical” and the “chemical” element, and finds expression “in the 
mineral system of the earth, the plant one and the animal one”. Taking 
the form of animal life, however, the idea of the organic “will break away 
from nature”, from being-other, from externality, and “posits itself as 
                                                        
18 Merker remarks: “According to Hegel the non-rigidity or dialectical quality of 
thought is only assured when this thought is the thought of a Whole (Idea) that divides 
itself into reason and nature, and hence a thought which has awareness of this division 
and clings to it as a contradiction within the very context of the Idea” (Merker 1961, 
134 and n. 126). In doing so, Hegel does not take account of the non-rigid and dialectic 
quality modern science acquires through the relation between hypotheses and their 
experimental testing.  
19 Hegel 1998a, 264, 262. 
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spirit”. It is significant that in the context of the physics of the heavenly 
bodies, the solar system, which Hegel describes as “the most sublime 
and purest expression of reason”, is regarded as “a living being” 
(Lebewesen, or animal in the Latin text).20 A clear allusion is being made 
here to the philosophy of nature expounded in Plato’s Timaeus. Hegel 
proves to be familiar with this dialogue and quotes it at the end of his 
Dissertatio, in relation to “Pythagorean numbers”.21 In particular, one is 
reminded here of that passage from the Timaeus reproduced by Hegel in 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in which Plato states that:  
the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no 
unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a 
whole; and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of 
soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in 
soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature 
fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the 
world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the 
providence of God.22  
Equally detectable is an implicit reference to Aristotle’s concept of 
nature, which Hegel – as argued in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy – 
considers superior to the one dominant in modern thought, precisely 
because it “understood nature as life, as unity which has its end within 
itself and unity with itself”.23 While thinkers, and especially modern 
thinkers, usually place nature within the category of necessity, Aristotle 
focuses his attention on “immanent finality”, regarding “necessity” as an 
“external condition”. “Nature – Hegel states when discussing Aristotle – 
means precisely that a thing will become what was already within it from 
the beginning: it is this immanent universality and finality that are 
accomplished”.24 
                                                        
20 Hegel 1998b, 237. See also Illetterati 1995, 105.  
21 Hegel 1979, 174  
22 Tim. 30b-c; cf. 30d; Hegel 1979, 230-231.  
23 Hegel 1979, 174.  
24 Ibid., 176. Here Hegel quotes Phys. B, 8, 199b: “But the person who asserts this 
entirely does away with ‘nature’ and what exists ‘by nature’. For those things are natural 
which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some 
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The principle of the vitality and dynamism of nature also underlies 
the idea of the system of heavenly bodies illustrated in the Dissertatio. The 
opposition between the “utmost density” of bodies and the “utmost 
rarefaction” of ether – and hence the “separation of bodies” – is 
overcome through the “primitive identity of nature”, ensuring the 
cohesion of the system and the mutual independence of heavenly bodies 
in the space they cover by rotating on their orbit: “nature – Hegel writes 
– does not want the system of heavenly bodies to coagulate into a single 
mass, nor that it fall into that sad state of natura naturata, there to share 
the fate of bodies, but that it be a living expression of reason and its 
likeness”.25  
This is enough to give an idea of the anti-mechanistic quality of 
Hegel’s philosophy of nature and of what was destined to become the 
guiding thread in his treatment of the subject, as already foreshadowed in 
his Science of Logic, namely the progressive movement from externality to 
internality, the progressive rising from the objectivity of nature to the 
subjectivity of the spirit, and hence the progressive passage from 
mechanism to life as the most direct manifestation of the idea.  
Nature – Hegel writes in the annotation to § 193 of the Encyclopaedia (1817) – is 
divine in itself, in the idea, but in the specific mode by which it is nature it is 
suspended. As it is, the being of nature does not correspond to its concept […] 
The highest level to which nature drives its existence is life, but as only a natural 
idea this is at the mercy of the unreason of externality.  
In § 195 Hegel further stresses the idea that nature in itself is “a 
living whole”, in the sense that it constitutes the movement by which the 
idea posits itself 
                                                                                                                                  
completion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance 
completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if there is no 
impediment.” 
25 Hegel (1998b), 251: “illud corporum coelestium systema non in unam massam 
coagulari, neque in tristem naturae naturatae statum et corporum sortem decidere sed 
rationis vivam expressionem suique immaginem esse voluit natura”. Cf. Negri 1984, 
XLVIII-XLIX. For a comment on the Dissertatio see Neuser 1986 and Negri 1984.  
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as that which it is in itself; or, what is the same thing, it goes into itself out of that 
immediacy and externality which is death, in order to exist as a living being; yet 
further, it suspends this determinacy of the idea, in which it is only life, and 
becomes spirit, which is its truth.26  
It is within the framework of this general speculative perspective 
that we must broach the issue of the concept of space, by starting from 
an engagement with the 1801 Dissertatio de orbitis planetarum and then 
focusing on Hegel’s first outlines his system, drawn at Jena, before the 
break with Schelling and the “phenomenological crisis of the system”. 
3. Nowadays, Hegel’s interest in the study of nature is usually traced back 
to his Bern period, when he was serving as a tutor for the von Steiger 
family: their country house in Tschugg boasted a library stacked with 
geometry and physics books pertaining to Newtonianism and Cartesian 
rationalism.27 On the other hand, with regard to the Habilitationschrift de 
orbitis planetarum, Rosenkranz informs us that Hegel “had already long 
come up with the topic: a research on the conformity to the laws on the 
mutual distances among planets”; he adds: “even before then, in his 
papers we find extracts from the mechanical and astronomical writings 
of Kant, Kepler and Newton, among others”.28 In his Dissertatio, as 
already observed by Rosenkranz, Hegel acknowledges astronomy’s debt 
towards Newton, precisely “on account of what it borrows from 
mathematics”; yet, at the same time, he argues that “it is necessary […] 
to distinguish between mathematical relations and the physical 
expression he [i.e. Newton] gave them”.29 One must not confuse the 
quantities that are the focus of mathematics, or the lines employed in 
geometry, with the forces or causes that are the object of physics. For 
instance – Hegel observes – “it is clear that the geometrical need for a 
tangent line in no way implies the need for a tangential physical force ”.30 
                                                        
26 Hegel 1817, § 193 Anm., 127-128, § 195, 130; cf. Hegel 1970c, § 248 Anm., 27-
28. See too Verra 2002, 21. 
27 See Ferrini 1996, 82.  
28 Rosenkranz 1988, 151 
29 Hegel 1998b, 246.  
30 Ibid., 240.  
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Hegel is no less critical of the possibility of demonstrating the forces of 
attraction or repulsion, or the centripetal force and the centrifugal, on 
the basis of the empiricist philosophy dominant in British culture which 
Newton and the Newtonians referred to. For this would mean 
attempting to define the whole starting from its parts, whereas the 
“genuine method” of geometry starts from the whole in order to deduce 
its parts:  
it does not seek to construct the circle or any other curve from lines intersecting 
at a right angle or any other way; on the contrary, it takes as given the circle or any 
curve under consideration and from it establishes the resulting relations of the rest 
of the line.31  
What empiricist philosophy fails to grasp is the principle of genuine 
philosophy, which – by drawing upon the conception of the Absolute as 
“identity of identity and non-identity” expounded in Differenz32 – Hegel 
enunciates in a later passage of the Dissertatio: “the principle of identity 
that posits difference within itself ”.33 This principle cannot be attained 
by “mechanical science, since it remains alien to the life of nature”, 
which is to say to nature as the objectification of the idea, as the hidden 
spirit that contains within itself a movement leading back to the idea as 
self-conscious spirit. As Hegel was to argue in the Science of Logic, with the 
empiricism and experimentalism of Newton and “the heirs of Bacon” as 
his polemical target, it is certainly  
a great service to ascertain the empirical numbers of nature, e.g., the distances of 
the planets from one another; but it is an infinitely greater service when the 
empirical quanta are made to disappear and they are raised into a universal form 
of determinations of quantity,  
so as to turn them into “moments of a law or of measure.” Here Hegel 
acknowledged Galileo and Kepler’s great merit with regard to the fall of 
                                                        
31 Ibid., 241-242. 
32 Hegel 1970b, 96: “Das Absolute selbst aber ist darum die Identität der Identität 
und der Nichtidentität; Entgegensetzen und Einssein ist zugleich in ihm.”  
33 Hegel 1998b, 247. On the criticism of Newton in the Dissertatio, see Marchetto 
2008, 48-49.  
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bodies and the motion of heavenly bodies respectively. The two 
scientists’ merit lies in the fact that they proved capable – unlike 
Newton, that is – of demonstrating “the laws they [had] discovered” by 
showing “the whole compass of the particulars of observation to 
correspond to them”.34 And yet, philosophy requires even more, namely 
that the quantitative determinations entailed by the various laws be 
deduced from the concepts or qualities of the terms which are set in 
mutual relation, in this case the concepts of space and time.  
Within the framework of mechanical science, matter is conceived as 
“inert matter”, one of the properties of which is gravity, and matter in all 
of its variety is explained through external causes. Hence Newton’s wish 
to introduce the idea of centrifugal force in order interpret the orbits of 
planets within the solar system, and his attempt to trace everything back 
to God. Indeed, in his Principia Newton argues: “This most beautiful 
system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the 
counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. [... ]. This 
Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over 
all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God”.35 
Now, Hegel observes that if this is the case, if everything may be traced 
back to God, then we should bear in mind that “God’s action is not 
external or mechanical, nor is it arbitrary or random”.36 The various 
forces, therefore, are to be conceived of as immanent in nature, and we 
are to acknowledge the latter’s rationality and inner laws.  
According to genuine philosophy, matter is always one and the 
same, just as gravity; it is an original whole which in its real 
differentiation divides itself into two poles, forming a “line of cohesion” 
between them, and in its ideal differentiation divides itself into the 
“factors” or “powers” of space and time. As has already been 
mentioned, this conjunction of unity and duality in the understanding of 
                                                        
34 Hegel 1969, 407. 
35 Newton 1846, 504. Newton assumes space and time to be absolute, 
unchangeable, eternal, infinite and independent of all material objects. 
36 Hegel 1998b, 247. 
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totality, of the whole, clearly echoes Schelling’s thought, 37and further 
reinforces the Hegelian conception of the whole as an identity which 
encloses differences within itself. Subsumed within the unity of a single 
term that is either gravity or matter – “gravity constitutes matter such 
that matter is objective gravity” – an absolute mutual identity emerges 
between space and time which cannot vary, which can neither grow nor 
diminish. By contrast, the relationship between time and space is marked 
by differences or quantitative relations insofar as they are regarded as the 
forms or factors (or “powers”, to use Schelling’s expression) in which 
gravity exists (“gravity must be said to be always one and the same, and 
existing in the form of two factors: space and time”). In such a way, time 
and space find themselves in a quantitative relation whereby “one 
increases when the other decreases”.38 For this very reason, Hegel praises 
the talent of Kepler, who never attributed “any increase or decrease to 
the force of gravity”, but merely “posited a relation between the two 
factors that can genuinely increase or diminish”.39 In this passage, Hegel 
also draws a distinction between space as such, as an extension devoid of 
motion, which is to say as “space at rest”, and space “generated by 
motion in time”. In the former sense, space appears to be an objective, 
abstract dimension, just as space and matter are connected to an abstract 
notion of the objective through the definition of matter as “filled space”, 
pure formless matter devoid of any principle of motion. Actually, a 
principle of motion does emerge, namely in the very act by which matter 
fills space, since matter entails a capacity to resist all other matter 
pressing to occupy its place. Yet, Hegel observes, the notion of 
resistance “is a purely negative and empty notion”: for once space is 
filled, there is no longer any principle of change – the latter must be 
                                                        
37 Schelling argued that “neither from duality alone nor from unity alone can one 
understand how things are born - one can only understand it from the necessary union 
of one thing in the other in their mutual Bond” (Schelling 1809, XXVI ).  
38 Hegel 1998b, 245-246. “Gravitas una eademque dicenda est, quae in forma 
duorum factorum, spatii et temporis, sive etiam spatii, ut ita dicam, quiescentis et spatii 
motu in tempore geniti existit: omnis autem quantitativa differentia et ratio ad hos 
factores pertinet, quorum altero diminuto alter augetur”.  
39 Ibid.  
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sought for elsewhere. In order to switch from a purely ideal and 
mathematical notion of matter as objectivity to the notion of matter as 
reality, as physical matter, it is necessary to introduce the form of 
subjectivity, which Hegel terms mens. This is a principle of negation of 
inert matter which, when applied to space, to space at rest, as pure 
extension, defines itself as the point. As Hegel himself suggests soon 
afterwards, in relation to space the principle of subjectivity or mens may 
actually be seen as the other factor or power of matter, which is to say 
time, whose action upon space engenders the point.40  
Starting from their original identity, which is matter, objective 
gravity, space and time distinguish themselves as separate factors or 
powers, only to always reassert their mutual identity in the end. This is 
the origin of change and motion: in physical terms, of the contraction 
and expansion of matter. One might refer here to Schelling’s conception 
of the relation between space and time. In space we first find the 
dispersal of the Bond – of the Absolute – in multiplicity, in the 
exteriority of things one outside of the other; in time we instead find the 
contraction of multiplicity into the unity and identity of an instant, which 
negates the dispersion and multiplicity of space and engenders change 
and the motion re-establishing the unity and identity of the Absolute.41 
Hegel also believes that it is the power of time, mens, which creates 
motion from the stillness of the point, its absolute exteriority; mens, time, 
which is self-production, engenders the line by entering into relation 
with space, with the point, yet still in a subjective and ideal form. In 
order to find expression, it must once again posit itself in space, in 
extension; together, the line and extension form the plane: “The line, 
therefore, – Hegel writes – is the mens producing itself, yet in its 
subjective and self-enclosed form: it then acquires its perfect and natural 
                                                        
40 Cf. ibid., 249. The relation between time and space is presented from a different 
angle by Aristotle. In a passage from Book IV of Physics, the philosopher points to “a 
correspondence” between the continuous and discrete structure of time and that of the 
point: “Time, then, also is both made continuous by the ‘now’ and divided at it”, and 
likewise “the point also both connects and terminates the length — it is the beginning 
of one and the end of another.”(Phys. Δ, 11, 220a).  
41 Cf. Schelling 1809, XXVII-XXVIII. 
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form by passing into the opposite, which is to say space, and constituting 
the plane”.42  
 
4. As we have seen, in Differenz nature is presented as the objective 
Subject-Object. Precisely for this reason, in nature we also find the 
moment or aspect of subjectivity. What this means, in the language of 
the Dissertatio, is that matter is not just extension but also thought, mens, 
i.e. it is not simply space but also time. From this point of view, in 
accordance with the place of nature within the system, space at rest, as 
mere extension, expresses the most extreme side of nature as exteriority, 
as the idea’s becoming other than itself, or more generally as objectivity 
and the opposite pole compared to the spirit. Time, by contrast, as the 
negation of space at rest, of mere extension, prior to reverting in turn to 
the spatiality of the point-instant, emerges as the power or factor of 
matter that reveals its subjective aspect – as the factor and power of 
motion and change. 
As Hegel argued a few years later, in a note to fragment 1 of his 
Naturphilosophie from 1803-04, “nature is in space; the whole of past 
history remains present; the spirit is in time: it has destroyed the past, its 
process of formation”.43  
The notice for this lecture course announced the exposition of a 
“philosophiae speculativae systema, complectens a) logicam et 
metaphysicam sive Idealismum transcendentalem, b) philosophiam 
naturae, c) philosophiam mentis”.44  
In Hegel’s Nachlass a sizeable group of fragments has been 
preserved from the manuscripts for this course, on the philosophy of 
nature and the philosophy of the spirit. I am here referring to fragments 
3 and 4. In fragment 3, Hegel describes the earth as embodying the 
opposition between matter as an inert mass and motion, which 
constitutes “the first simple potency of the earth, which is to say 
                                                        
42 Hegel 1998b, 249. 
43 Hegel 1975, 5.  
44 On the notices for Hegel’s lectures at Jena, see Kimmerle 1967, 53-56. On the 
philosophy of nature at Jena, see Neuser 2004.  
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mechanism”.45 In fragment 4 he adds that mechanism “immediately arises 
with what has brought about the passage from the heavenly system to 
the terrestrial system, i.e. with the reduction of motion through rest, and 
the falling of the two terms (motion and rest) one outside of the other”. 
Actually, in separating, these continue “to relate to one another, since their 
separation derives from their original being one”, for one term passes 
into the other as its opposite and this means that “they – motion and rest 
– are simply in relation to one another” . This original “being one” of 
motion and rest, however, is at first an “empty, invisible being one”: it is 
the earth as “this wholly indeterminate being one” . Mechanism is precisely the 
mode of being of nature (the earth) in which the unity of motion and 
rest comes about, “the establishment of what constitutes the unity of inert 
mass and motion.”46 We here find a reference to space and time. Motion 
extends to inert mass, engendering real matter, whose “ideal moments 
are time and space” – whereas its “real, independent moments are 
bodies”47. Space emerges here as the positive unity of mass, i.e. of inert 
matter, which nonetheless has within itself the memory – so to speak – 
of its own original unity with motion. This lends matter an inner 
animation in the form of the negative unity of the “absolute point”: 
“mass – Hegel writes – is absolute unity equal to itself, in which negative 
unity subsists, the absolute point ”48. The insertion of the “absolute point”, 
identified in the Dissertatio as the application of time to space, generates a 
multiplicity of points and limits, meaning that the mass, space/matter, 
divides itself into countless indivisible parts, or atoms. An infinite 
quantity (Menge) of quanta (Quanti) thereby emerges, which is to say of 
parts stemming from the negation of the universal mass. Each of them, 
as itself mass, contains its own centre (Mittelpunkt) within itself.49 While 
mutually distinct, quanta are all essentially the same: “one is a quantum 
as much another”. In their self-equality and non-differentiation, they are 
                                                        
45 Hegel 1975, 11. 
46 Ibid., 19-20 (fragm. 4). 
47 Ibid., 11-12 (fragm. 3). 
48 Ibid., 12 (fragm. 3). 
49 Ibid., 24-25(fragm. 4). 
The Concept of Space in Hegel: The Early Jena Years  
 45 
inert, yet this inertia affects their very mutual independence and 
distinction; as the removal of their independence, it takes the form of 
gravity, which presents itself as the fall of a body with a rectilinear 
motion that finds its beginning and end, its starting point and point of 
arrival, in its opposite, namely rest. 
5. The notice for Hegel’s lectures for the winter semester of 1804/05 
reflects a significant change in the development of his system, which is 
no longer generally described as “philosophiae speculativae systema”, 
but rather as “tota philosophiae scientia”, articulated into “philosophia 
speculativa (logica et metaphysica), naturae et mentis.” This lecture plan 
was again adopted in the summer semester of 1805, when Hegel also 
announced he was just about to publish a book presenting his system 
(although the same announcement had already been made in the 1802 
and 1803 notices). Manuscript 9 of Hegel’s Nachlass, on Logik, Metaphysik 
und Naturphilosophie, may indeed be associated with these two courses 
from the 1804/05 winter semester and 1805 summer semester, as part of 
the philosopher’s second plan for the presentation of his system.50 At the 
end of the section devoted to metaphysics, the spirit is said to recognise 
itself in the idea of absolute existence; for this very reason, however, it 
does not yet recognise itself as absolute spirit. It has become such for us, 
in itself, but not yet for itself. The absolute spirit must manifest its idea, 
it must manifest itself as absolute spirit, possessing self-awareness. The 
first moment in this realisation of the absolute spirit is nature, which is 
the absolute spirit itself grasping itself as objectivity. According to Hegel, 
this first self-positing of the absolute spirit is “nature, the simple absolute 
spirit referring itself to itself; it is ether, absolute matter […], living 
nature”.51  
Hence the philosophy of nature distinguishes itself from the 
common way of envisaging nature, for it presents the latter as consisting 
                                                        
50 This manuscript may be found in Bd. 7 of the critical edition of the Hegel’s 
Gesammelte Werke published by the Reinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften 
and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.  
51 Hegel 1971, 177-178.  
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“of wholes and parts in different quantities, and in a causal relation, as 
well as a quantity of ‘these’ [single, determined things]”.52 This way in 
which reality appears and presents itself is an abstract and purely ideal 
one, stemming from reflection and the intellect. The true appearance and 
reality of nature, by contrast, is its appearance as spirit, the reality of the 
spirit. This appearance of nature, this reality of the spirit, is internal to 
nature itself, it is part of its very essence, and not something added to it 
by the knower from the outside: “its essence is within itself, its reality is 
that of being a living nature, a self-reflecting infinity, of knowing, and its 
matter, which is to say its absolute self-equality, is life”.53 What comes to 
the fore here, in the introductory pages of Naturphilosophie, is the 
characterisation of nature as life, as “hidden spirit”, as the other for the 
spirit whose process consists in becoming other than itself, as the other 
of the other, i.e. the acquisition of self-awareness on the part of the 
spirit: nature in its totality is “the becoming of the existence of the spirit 
as Ego”.54  
The spiritual substance first finds objective expression as ether or 
absolute, infinite and indeterminate matter. In its absolute restlessness, 
this ether, or absolute matter, is like the spirit, which is equal to itself in 
its being other than itself: it is the capacity to take up any form – 
absolute plasticity and elasticity.55 As Giordano Bruno argued, “ether 
[…] knows no specific quality, but receives all those lent to it by nearby 
bodies.”56 According to Henry More - as Koyré writes - ether is 
a substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the 
whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a plastic power therein, according to 
the sundry predispositions and occasions of the parts it works upon, raising such 
Phenomena in the world, by directing the parts of the matter and their motion as 
cannot be resolved into mere mechanical powers.57  
                                                        
52 Ibid., 180. 
53 Ibid., 180-181. 
54 Ibid., 186. 
55 Ibid., 188. 
56 Bruno 1972a, 529.  
57 Koyré 1970, 104-105.  
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Ether, as the highest part of the sky, as light expanding in an absolute 
way, is absolutely infinite. Its moments are only “ideal moments, which 
in their mutual opposition refer to one another”; they “are absolutely 
restless in this relation” and remove one another in their separateness. 
These moments of the ether, “which immediately discloses itself as 
genuinely infinite”, are space and time. This “infiniteness is motion”; or 
rather: “as totality, it is a system of spheres and motions [heavenly 
bodies]”58. One is reminded here of Bruno’s definition: “there is one sky, 
an immense ethereal region, where these magnificent lights keep their 
proper distances in order to participate in eternal life”.59 Space and time, 
then, present themselves as ideal moments of the ether, which is to say 
of nature as directly posited by the spirit as its first manifestation. These 
are ideal moments because the reality of the ether is both its self-equality, 
its sameness to itself, and its infiniteness, its infinite motion. Its self-
equality and being at rest represent the moment of space, considered 
separately; yet insofar as this manifests itself, insofar as it objectively 
fulfils its being in itself, it represents the opposite of self-equality and 
being at rest: it is the moment of infinity and motion (from the equal to 
its opposite, the unequal and different) – hence, time. Just as infinite as 
space, time, as an ideal moment, in becoming other than itself spills into 
its opposite, into self-equality and rest, thus becoming space. Ether, as 
the whole, possesses this motion within itself, so that from space it 
becomes time and from time space, since the whole is the unity of the 
self-equal and the different60 – the ontological or speculative principle on 
which the whole Hegelian system is founded. Here too it is worth 
bearing in mind the influence of Schelling and of his crucial idea that the 
relation between space and time in nature is based on the mutual 
negation of the separate identity of each. On the other hand, in the fact 
that according to Hegel ether immediately posits itself as space we find 
the same idea of a close interrelation between ether and space affirmed 
                                                        
58 Hegel 1971,192. 
59 Bruno 1972b, 34.  
60 Hegel 1971, 193.  
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by Bruno and Kepler, according to whom all space is filled with ether. 
Even Newton believed that ether fills space, at least within the solar 
system.61 Yet this notion is here turned on its head, so to speak, since 
according to Hegel it is ether, as the totality of all moments, that 
constitutes the reality of space and time: “the reality of space and time 
[…], as separate terms, is the expression of the totality of moments”; the 
“essence” of each of these remains their mutual “relation”.62 It is also 
worth recalling here what Hegel states when illustrating Plotinus’ 
thought, namely that “space is the pure abstract continuity of the activity 
of light – not being active as such, however, but rather the form of its 
being uninterrupted”;63 for indeed space, as Hegel stresses once again, is 
the ideal – i.e. abstract and formal – moment of the absolute self-equality 
of the ether.64 
6. Space as absolute space, by its very concept, is self-equality which has 
difference, the infinite, outside itself, and hence also the negative, limit, 
outside itself. Within absolute space, this limit, this counterpart to the 
infinite, or time, is the point: “Just as time moves outside itself and 
becomes space, so space must move into itself and remove itself through 
the point”.65  
The point introduces a limitation within the indeterminate 
continuity of space. This, however, does not make absolute space 
determined space, but rather introduces “the concept of a general 
dimension within it”.66 Yet, because of this indeterminate limitation, in 
the very act of positing itself in space, this dimension is likewise 
“removed” – not eliminated, but simultaneously negated and preserved. 
This means that “a second dimension in general” is placed “as a 
[determined] limiting which relates to the indeterminate limiting of 
space”. This new dimension presents itself as “the first being- limited of 
                                                        
61 Koyré 1970, 132-133. 
62 Hegel 1971, 193.  
63 Hegel 1979, 452.  
64 Hegel 1971, 192. 
65 Ibid., 197. 
66 Ibid., 198. 
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space, as surface”, which is “the relation between two dimensions”67, “the 
union of the negative and space”.68 This means that the surface is the 
being-other or opposite of space, placed in relation to space itself, which 
therefore appears to be divided, yet not negated, but on the contrary 
reconfirmed in its indifference and universality:  
It, the surface, is indeed the limiting of space, yet it is not the free limit itself, like a 
negative, but rather the union of the negative and space, the synthesis of both. In 
other words, it is the opposite of space placed in relation to space itself, as the 
negation of space, so that this is only divided – there are two spaces, but in such a 
way that space is indifferent in this negation and remains equal to itself, and its 
negation is nothing at all.69 
Within space, as self-equality, each form of determinateness becomes 
indifferent, and hence the negation of the being-other of space turns out 
to be a formal negation which remains internal to space. This negation of 
surface is the line, which is “the dimension of direction”; as “real 
dimension” it becomes “the expression of the dimension of space in 
general”.70 In its treatment of the dimensions of space, the text from 
1804-05 alludes to a distinction that was more broadly formulated in the 
1805-06 lecture course and taken up later on as well. This is the 
distinction, best illustrated in the presentation of the philosophy of 
nature provided in the Enzyklopädie of 1827-1830, between on the one 
hand a domain of the “distinctions” of space that has to do with its 
“indifference” and self-equality and which directly assumes dimensions 
according to their current meaning as height (or depth), length and 
width; and on the other a domain of distinctions that is essentially 
determined and qualitative, and stems from the concept itself. Within the 
former domain, dimensions are assumed according the current, common 
meaning they also possess in geometry, as height (or depth), width and 
                                                        
67 Ibid., 199. 
68 Ibid., 200. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 201. 
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length.71 Within the second domain, a first dimension is provided by the 
“negation of space itself” as pure exteriority, and this negation is the 
point. A second dimension is given by the “line”, “the spatial existence 
of the point”. A third dimension, constituted by the negation of the 
negation, is provided by the surface, “which on the one hand is a 
determination compared to the line and the point”, but on the other 
represents “the re-establishment of the spatial totality”.72 In his analysis 
of dimensions, in the text from 1805-06 Hegel refers both to the 
dimensions stemming from the concept itself – point, line, surface – and 
to those which in space only express “different directions”: height, width 
and length. The latter correspond to internal determinations: front and 
rear, right and left, above and below73. In the text from 1804-05 Hegel 
draws attention to the fact that while the dimensions of space are the 
moments of the realisation of space, they might also be other than three 
(“the determination of number – Hegel writes – immediately comes 
about as an extrinsic determination, which has the form of 
contingency”)74. Absolute space, moreover, tends to remove its own 
dimensions, to negate its own determinations, as surface and line; to 
negate its own limitations and rule out the multiplicity of determined 
spaces: in such a way it contracts into the point – “it is the point”. As 
absolute space, space is a positive totality; as point, it is a negative 
totality. These two modes of totality, however, fall one outside of the 
                                                        
71 The three-dimensionality of space is envisaged by Aristotle as a feature that 
place has in common with bodies, although place itself cannot be conceived as a body 
(Phys. Δ, 1, 209a). According to Aristotle, place is “the innermost motionless boundary 
of what contains” (Phys. Δ, 4, 212 a) or indeed “the limit […] in the limited” (Phys. Δ, 4, 
212 b).  
72 Hegel 1970c, §§ 255, 256, 44-45. Taking his cue from Hegel, Dieter 
Wandschneider has developed his own philosophy of nature in relation to 
contemporary natural sciences. In particular, he has delineated an “interpretation of the 
three-dimensionality of space within the horizon of a theory of principles”. With regard 
to Hegel’s treatment of space, Wandschneider has emphasised that “Hegelian 
deduction […] interprets space as a concept within the elemen t of exteriority and 
traces the principle of three-dimensionality back to the affinity between the moments 
of this concept: singularity, particularity, and universality” (Wandschneider 1984, 226-
227). 
73 Cf. Hegel 1976, 7-10.  
74 Hegel 1971, 201. 
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other, and hence must be placed in mutual relation through an 
intermediary, namely: the surface and line, which unite the absolute 
singularity of the point and the empty universality of absolute space. Yet, 
precisely because positive totality and negative totality, universality and 
singularity, self-equality and infinity are terms that fall one outside the 
other, space, in realising itself as self-equality, spills into its opposite, into 
the “simple infiniteness of time”. The latter, in turn, when realising itself, 
had passed into its opposite, the self-equality of space. “Space – Hegel 
concludes – in its real realisation has passed into its opposite, into time, 
just as time has passed into space”.75 This text from 1804-05 confirms 
the theory of the ideality – or abstractness – of space and time 
considered in themselves, as separate, and of the reality of space-time as 
the being of time in space and the being of space in time. To be more 
precise: “time exists only insofar as it becomes space, and space only 
insofar as it becomes time, and vice versa, the one only insofar as it 
reverts to the other ”.76 The “real union” of the two is “the real infinity 
of the ether”, of absolute matter, which is motion.77 
7. As has been mentioned, Hegel’s treatment of the concept of space in 
his course for the winter semester of 1805-06 coincided with a moment 
of crisis for his system. This was the first and only time in which Hegel 
made no provisions for lessons on logic and metaphysics: the only 
aspects of the “whole science of philosophy” he addressed were those 
pertaining to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the spirit, 
which he brought together under the title of philosophia realis 
(Realphilosophie). Hegel’s presentation of the philosophy of nature and the 
philosophy of the spirit independently from any exposition of his 
system, his unwillingness to expound on logic and metaphysics, and 
finally the fact that he introduced a seminar on the history of philosophy 
may all be connected to the so-called “phenomenological crisis of the 
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system”78. This was a stage of development of Hegel’s thought in which, 
in conjunction with his attempt to distance himself from Schelling and to 
emphasise the “scientificity” of his own philosophy, the problem of 
“philosophical propaedeutics” emerged in all of its broadness and depth: 
the need for a science of the experience of knowledge capable of 
justifying and providing the foundations for the horizon of “absolute 
knowledge” within which Hegel sought to expound his system. These 
changes also influenced Hegel’s philosophy of nature, first of all by 
leading to a greater stress upon the exteriority of nature, as first and most 
prominently attested by the exteriority of space: “The first or immediate 
determination of nature – Hegel writes in § 197 of his 1817 Encyclopädie – 
is the abstract universality of its being outside itself – its unmediated 
indifference, space.” In the annotation to this paragraph, after recalling 
that according to Kant “space, like time, is a form of sensory intuition”, 
Hegel stresses the correctness of Kant’s determination of space as “a 
pure form, which is to say an abstraction – more precisely, that of 
immediate exteriority”.79 
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